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Abstract- Micro service architecture has revolutionized the 
landscape for the development of web and mobile applications 
alike. Due to the stateless nature and loose coupling involved in 
the design of micro services, native mobile applications can be 
developed by utilizing the same backend services which feed the 
inputs to the web application front ends. Extending the same 
concept, a plethora of automated devices, thanks to the 
advancements in the field of IOT, have come into existence which 
can feed on the same set of micro services. This concept of build 
once and utilize for many use cases has become a new norm in 
the enterprise design patterns. To handle the horizontal 
scalability needs of so many calling clients, significant 
advancements have been made on the containerization and their 
orchestration strategies on the public cloud platforms. However, 
scalable design techniques have led to the increased exposure of 
backend services to unwanted entities. This broadened the attack 
surface and also the risk. On top of it the mix of heterogeneous 
technologies in MSA, their distinct logging strategies, makes the 
central logging difficult, which in turn loosens the security. 
Additionally, the complexity around building the resilience for 
fault tolerance across the decentralized networks, adds to the 
security loop holes. The simple security designs which were once 
used with traditional web applications cannot be used for 
Microservice based applications. This paper articulates the 
innovative approaches of handling the security needs involved in 
protection of distributed services in Microservice architecture.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally all the web applications were designed as 
monolithic in nature. In that traditional setup, MVC (Model, 
View Controller) was the most popular paradigm. Application 
would have a web server where all the static content like images, 
java script and HTML was hosted. In an internet based web 
application, these web servers are deployed in the DMZ 
(demilitarized zone) network layer. The web application code 
itself is compiled and packed as an enterprise archive file(.ear) 
or a web archive file (.war) file. This archive file is deployed on 
the enterprise application servers like IBM web sphere, BEA 
web logic, JBOSS EAP server or Apache Tomcat server to name 
a few. These servers are deployed in the organization’s internal 
network and shielded from being directly exposed to internet. 
This archive file would communicate with the backend 
databases, other data stores, or would integrate with third party 
services using web services or asynchronous integration 
mechanisms. This application deployment pattern can be 
visualised in the Figure 1 below. 
As it can be understood from the diagram that the number of 
entry points to the backend layer are very limited in a 
monolithic design structure. Not every layer or a component of 
the application is exposed to the outside world and none of 
them would accept requests directly from outside. In a typical 
web application such as the one in Figure 1, all the input 
requests are scanned for security at the web server level by 
using a SiteMinder agent which can connect to LDAP systems. 
Once the request is authenticated it then passes down to the 
application level. At this level the requests are further filter by 
a servlet filter. This security check verifies whether the 
incoming request is associated with a valid session identifier or 
not. If not, it challenges the incoming request session to 
authenticate first. Further authorization checks may be in place 
to validate that the requesting user has the necessary roles and 
permissions to access the intended resources. The intercepting 
servlet filter carries out such tasks centrally to make sure that 
only authenticated and authorized requests are dispatched to 
the corresponding resources. Internal layers and code blocks 
may not be concerned about the legitimacy of the requests; 
they can be confident that if a request ends up there, all the 
security checks would have already been taken care of. On top 
of it, since these are stateful applications, the internal 
components can acquire the user information at any point of 
time by querying the web session in hand. It is the servlet filer 
which injects the incoming user information into the session 
variables during the initial filter process. However, the security 
design cannot be so simple in case of distributed Microservice 
based architecture. With the advent of cloud platforms and 
discovery of containerization techniques using docker etc. and 
orchestrating software like Kubernetes or docker swarm etc. 
have complicated the problem even further as explained in the 
section below. 
II. DESIGN COMPLEXITY IN SECURING MSA 
Micro services architecture deals with breaking down the 
application to smaller and independent deployable units for 
getting a number of benefits [1] [2] including but not limited to 
– 
• service isolation 
• separation of concerns 
• horizontal scalability and containerization 
• quicker build cycles 
• easier maintenance 
• Isolation of failures 
• cloud portability etc. 
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Figure 1 - Traditional Monolithic MVC application design 
 
 
This design has helped to solve many issues which a traditional 
monolithic application could not have aimed for. But at the same 
time, it introduced the following security challenges –  
(1) since the logic layer and middle tier of the application is split 
into so many smaller and independent pieces, the attack surface 
has significantly increased. (2) Also, due to the lose coupling of 
the front end and backend layers, it permitted multiple front-end 
systems to talk to the backend services. This has also broadened 
the attack surface. (3) with the rise of Internet of Things (IOT) 
many automated devices started interacting with the micro 
service layers. Since there is no human intervention involved in 
these data transfers, authentication and authorization are not 
straight forward.  
Due to these reasons, legacy techniques which were once used 
for protecting the monolithic web applications can no longer be 
used in case of micro service architectures. Since the back end 
micro services can be widely distributed, they can be present in 
a single datacentre or a cloud environment or a combination of 
data canters and public clouds [3]. On top of it, unlike monolith 
the front end and backend are totally detached, and the backend 
services can now be written in heterogeneous technologies [4]. 
For example- few services might be running on Java language 
and other might be on Node.JS or Python. The microservice 
architecture at a high level can be visualized from Figure 2 given 
below. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Microservice architecture design 
 
III. SECURING THE MICRO SERVICES 
Traditionally security teams have always focussed on 
protecting the databases, network and infrastructure layers. But 
with the introduction of distributed MSA architectures[8][9], 
the attack vector has shifted to service side of applications. This 
is evident from some of the major cyber-attacks which occurred 
in the recent times. A robust security design for MSA needs to 
focus on the following main areas – 
A. Securing the attack surface 
Problem – As explained in the earlier sections the attack 
surface has snowballed in the recent times due to the 
proliferation of the services using their containerization 
designs and auto-scaling features on public clouds [10]. Front 
end systems are isolated and can most likely be more than 
one, unlike the traditional design where backend and front end 
are packed as one unit. Old security designs using web access 
management agents like SiteMinder running on top of 
webservers cannot be applied to distributed microservices 
with segregated from the front-end systems [5][6].  
 
Solution - For securing the distributed microservices 
which are segregated from the front-end systems, there needs 
to be an authentication and authorization mechanism which 
can generate the tokens which are short lived. The movement 
towards this approach, caused software teams to look for 
security tokens that worked with RESTful and JSON formats. 
Some of the token technology that evolved from this 
requirement include JSON web token (JWT) and OAuth 2.0. 
OpenID and Auth0 are the 2 important protocols which can 
solve this issue. Also, to reduce the exposure of services to the 
callers, there needs to be a single point of contact which can 
route the calls to the appropriate backend service. This gave 
way to API gateways. Figure 3 describes the high-level design 
for using the token-based mechanisms using API gateways.  
Here is a high-level flow which explains how the token 
mechanisms can protect the backend services –  
• User (Resource owner) requests the protected resource 
which is hosted on a microservice (resource server) 
• Front end (client) checks if the valid token is present. If not, 
it sends the user to a login page which has multiple 
authentication challenges depending on the organizational 
needs. 
• Once user enters the authentication credentials, a call is 
made to the authorization server via the API gateway. 
• Authorization server authenticates the user credentials by 
validating it with the identity provider. This can be any 
LDAP system present in the organization. 
• If the credentials are valid, the authorization server returns 
a short-lived access token and a refresh token to the front-
end system. 
• Front end stores the refresh token. It calls the resource 
server again by passing the access token in the request 
header. 
• API gateway has a filter mechanism, which first validates 
the access token by firing an authorization check with the 
authorization server. 
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• If the check passes, the request is sent to the resource server 
for delivering the request needed by the user. 
• If in case the access token is invalid, the authorization 
server denies access, which is handled by the front-end 
system as a message on the login screen. 
• In case, the access token is expired, the front-end system 
can request a new access token from the authorization 
server by passing the refresh token. 
If the refresh token is invalid too, then the front end can request 
the user to re-login to the application. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – MSA security using STS and API gateway. 
 
B. Defence-in-Depth implementation. 
 
Problem – Backend services are of various sensitivities 
and priorities. It cannot be one size fits for all strategy for all 
services. Depending on the micro service the level of security 
should be changed. For example, there may be public read 
APIs which can be exposed to all callers. There can be other 
services which can be exposed once the caller is authenticated 
and there can be some other premium services or admin 
services which not only need to be authorized based on the 
user profile but also be protected carefully. Simple STS with 
API gateway cannot be a solution for this need. 
 
Solution – For handling this kind of services, a strategy like 
defense in depth needs to be employed. Defense in depth is a 
concept in which multiple layers of security controls (defense) 
are placed throughout the system rather than a single defense 
system across all layers. For the use case where extra level of 
security needs to be implemented for premium or admin 
services, there can be an additional layer of security in the 
form of private API gateway (not exposed to callers) with an 
additional filter and authorization scheme. If a caller needs to 
reach these inner secure layers, they need to access via façade 
services and pass an extra level of authorization as shown in 
Figure 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 – Defence in depth in MSA security using private API gateway. 
 
 
C. Principle of least privilege. 
 
Problem- Due to the database per service pattern, each 
service is independent of the other, including the databases. For 
a transaction which joins multiple domains, services need to 
talk to each other either directly or via orchestrating saga 
patterns. Many a times inter service communication is complex 
to implement. Such design would need to be intricately done. It 
is a challenge to narrow down the rules which govern the 
privileges and permissions for the APIs involved in the 
services. 
 
Solution-APIs need to be designed based on principle of least 
privilege. Access need to be given only to those users who are 
not only authenticated but authorized to access the API. API 
access only need to be granted based on the need. Start with a 
minimum access and only expand based on the need. 
 
D. Encryption everywhere. 
 
Problem- Services can be decomposed efficiently using 
various governing principles like Common Closure Principle 
(CCP) and Single Responsibility Principle (SRP), to achieve 
the maximum isolation. But the interservice communication is 
unavoidable as the transactions span across multiple entities. 
Also, the data is persisted in multiple heterogeneous database 
technologies based on the needs. Securing the data is a 
challenge. 
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Solution- Encrypting the data at rest using technologies like 
Vormetric transparent encryption or by using the secure keys 
which are rotated once in every few days might solve the 
security needs for the data at rest. Also, the storage buckets 
for the files and caching systems should be encrypted using 
secure passwords. Not only the data at rest but the data in 
transit should be encrypted using certificates and SSL layers.  
 
E. Continuous scanning, monitoring, logging -DevSecOps. 
Problem – There are various other problems deeply embedded 
in MSA. Since all the services are stateless, independent and 
heterogeneous, there cannot be a uniform logging pattern and 
framework. This makes threat identification difficult. The other 
challenge with most development teams is the early 
identification of the vulnerabilities before they creep to 
production. And also, designing the security around the 
containers and various components is a complex challenge.  
 
Solution- In case of microservices, it is imperative and essential 
to design a central log aggregation solution. This would help 
narrow down the issue faster and avoid corruption to other 
layers and services. Along with these employing appropriate 
CAST and DAST scans would mitigate the issues upfront. 
Also, the methodology of Devops should shift to DevSecOps 
where Dev, Ops and Security teams make a combined call on 
micro service architecture rather than dealing with a siloed 
approach. Constant monitoring and feedback mechanisms may 
be employed for better results. 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This paper outlines some of the important concepts which 
are needed for securing the distributed service architectures. 
However, securing the services in a MSA is relatively new 
concept and would continue to evolve more in the coming 
years. Lot of research is also being done in the field of AI where 
the threat can be forecasted based on the oddities in the service 
requests, responses or interaction patterns. These forecasts can 
be validated using the machine learning techniques to come up 
with mechanisms to avoid the infiltration. At the minimum, the 
service can be shut down by invoking the circuit breakers and 
alerting the responsible parties. Future scope of work includes 
devising the innovative techniques to implement the multi 
factor authentication (MFA) based security in the IOT devices 
which do not have any human intervention. 
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